Martin Buber and Socrates on Genuine Dialogue
“But how lovely and how fitting the sound of the lively and impressive I of Socrates! It is the I of endless dialogue, and the air of dialogue is wafted around it in all its journeys.” — Martin Buber, I and Thou, 46 (Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith)
Martin Buber was a 20th century Austrian-Israeli philosopher whose work on the philosophy of dialogue has had a far-reaching influence, including on humanistic psychology and psychotherapy (Abramovitch, 181).
Socrates was an ancient Greek philosopher who features predominantly in the dialogues of his follower Plato and whose portrayal in those works has had a vast influence on the entirety of the western philosophical tradition.
The purpose of this article is to explore similarities between each thinker’s conception of genuine dialogue – an exploration which, to my knowledge, hasn’t been made, despite Buber identifying Socrates as an exemplar of the practice of genuine dialogue (as quoted above). I will highlight several key characteristics of Buber’s conception of genuine dialogue, drawing largely from his 1957 essay “Elements of the Interhuman” as it appears in the 1999 collection Martin Buber on Psychology and Psychotherapy, connecting each of these characteristics with a Socratic precedent, following the interpretations of Plato scholars.
First, I will briefly review the central concept of Buber’s philosophy of dialogue: I-you and I-it relationships.
Buber’s I-you and I-it relationships
The central concept of Buber’s philosophy of dialogue is that there are two primary types of human relationships: I-you and I-it relationships.
I-you relationships are those which are characterized by total acceptance of and attunement toward another. I-you relationships are dialogical relationships, or relationships characterized by dialogue. An example of an I-you relationship is a deep and immersive conversation in which all parties are actively engaged.
I-it relationships are those in which we are emotionally distant from another person we engage with and take an instrumental view of that person, who therefore becomes not a “you” but an “it.” In other words, we objectify that person, or treat that person as if they were an object. An example would be a typical exchange at a fast-food restaurant, where the customer gives the order, and the worker receives it. The interaction is mechanical and transactional.
A relationship with a given person can (and will) fluctuate between I-you and I-it, with even the most loving relationships featuring instances of the latter. For Buber, I-it relationships are not bad in themselves, and are even necessary at times for a functioning society or household. However, to be most human and experience reality most fully, we need I-you relationships.
Marks of genuine dialogue
Let’s now explore several characteristics of genuine dialogue according to Martin Buber – which is to say characteristics of I-you relationships, along with Socratic precedents for each.
Unconditional acceptance of one’s dialogical partner(s)
Both Buber and Socrates understand genuine dialogue as requiring unconditional acceptance of one’s dialogical partner(s). Put another way, genuine dialogue requires that one is willing to understand one’s dialogical partner(s) as she is.
In Buber’s words:
“In genuine dialogue the turning to the partner takes place in all truth, that is, it is a turning of the being. […] The true turning of his person to the other includes this confirmation, this acceptance. Of course, such a confirmation does not mean approval; but no matter in what I am against the other, by accepting him as my partner in genuine dialogue, I have affirmed him as a person.” (Buber 2, 65–86)
Similarly, philosopher Guido Calogero, writing about Socrates’ ideal of dialogue, states the following:
“[T]he […] duty of dialogue is always the absolute duty to comprehend the situation of other people […] To live according to the ideal of dialogue implies as a matter of fact total benevolence, total absence of hostility toward another. However odious and heretical his behavior appears to me, I must always understand it according to the reasons he gives, and not only judge him according to my reasons, and if I think I have to persuade him of my reasons, I cannot expect him to think or act differently before he has been persuaded.” (Calogero, 303, my trans.)
For both Buber and Socrates, this unconditional acceptance of the dialogical partner is not an unconditional acceptance of that person’s views. Rather, the unconditional acceptance of the person is the precondition for understanding that person’s views. Once understood, and only once understood, can one hope to persuade someone to change his or her views.
Expressing oneself without regard to personal reputation
For genuine dialogue to occur, Buber and Socrates both cite the necessity of all dialogical partners to be willing to give an honest account of their beliefs on the topic of discussion and to be willing to do so without regard to personal reputation.
Buber says:
“[I]f genuine dialogue is to arise, everyone who takes part in it must bring himself into it. And that also means that he must be willing on each occasion to say what is really in his mind about the subject of the conversation. And that means further that on each occasion he makes the contribution of his spirit without reduction and without shifting his ground.” (Buber 2, 86)
Further, he adds:
“In the atmosphere of genuine dialogue, he who is ruled by the thought of his own effect as the speaker of what he has to speak, has a destructive effect. If instead of what has to be said, I try to bring attention to my I, I have irrevocably miscarried what I have to say; it enters the dialogue as a failure, and the dialogue is a failure.” (Buber 2, 86–87)
In Plato’s Charmides, Socrates similarly implores his interlocutor Critias to give an account of his beliefs on the topic under discussion without consideration of his reputation as speaker or whether his belief is refuted.
“Then take heart, I said, my admirable friend, and answer the question put to you as you deem the case to be, without caring a jot whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted: give the argument itself your attention, and observe what will become of it under the test of refutation.” (Plato, Charmides, 166d–e)
Here Socrates implores Critias to answer a question honestly without regard to any personal interest as to whether his answer is ultimately refuted, or in other words, how his reputation fairs.
To sum up, Buber and Socrates agree that genuine dialogue is corroded when one or more speakers place their attention on how they are ‘coming across’ to others rather than on the content of the dialogue itself.
Genuine dialogue is unscripted
Both Buber and Socrates believe that for dialogue to be genuine, it must be unscripted.
Buber says:
“No one, of course, can know in advance what it is that he has to say; genuine dialogue cannot be arranged beforehand.” (Buber 2, 88)
He makes the point that because genuine dialogue necessarily involves the meeting of different minds, each participant in dialogue cannot know exactly how the exchange will unfold and therefore one will corrupt the genuineness of the exchange if one’s speech is prepared ahead of time.
Socrates too believes that dialogue must be unscripted. In Plato’s Protagoras, Socrates attempts to engage a famous rhetorician named Protagoras in dialogue on the question of whether virtue can be taught. When Socrates asks a question of Protagoras, Protagoras does not provide a genuine answer but rather gives an elaborate and ambiguous prepared speech (Gonzalez, 42). Socrates ultimately says:
“I thought that to hold a joint discussion and to make a speech were two distinct things.” (Plato, Protagoras, 336b)
Eventually, Protagoras reluctantly (and superficially) agrees to forego prepared speeches and engage in true dialogue with Socrates. However, he then asks Socrates to interpret a famous poem and then provides a prepared refutation of that poem, again showing an unwillingness to engage in genuine dialogue (Gonzalez, 43).
Here, Socrates makes the point that Buber makes above, that genuine dialogue cannot be arranged ahead of time, like a speech can be, because it must be responsive to the unique context of the dialogue.
Though we can enter into a dialogue with a topic in mind and with points to make on that topic, if we are truly to be present with and responsive to our conversational partners, the dialogue must unfold organically as each partner’s contributions to the dialogue necessarily change the course of the dialogue.
Open participation
Buber and Socrates both believe that for dialogue to be genuine, it must be inclusive, arguing that if anyone present be excluded, the dialogue will likely become a failure.
Buber says:
“Of course it is not necessary for all who are joined in a genuine dialogue actually to speak; those who keep silent can on occasion be especially important. But each must be determined not to withdraw when the course of the conversation makes it proper for him to say what he has to say…The genuineness of the dialogue is called in question as soon as even a small number of those present are felt by themselves and by the others as not being expected to take any active part.” (Buber 2, 88)
Here Buber makes the point that not everyone involved in a dialogue must be an active speaker, but that everyone be free to contribute what they think they ought to, so as not to become a passive spectator to the dialogue (we will explore the corrosive nature of passive spectating on dialogue in the next section).
In Plato’s Protagoras, during the same dispute reviewed above (between dialogue or prepared speech), someone suggests appointing a ‘supervisor’ to make sure that neither Socrates or Protagoras are giving overlong answers indicative of prepared speech and not genuine dialogue.
Socrates responds that anyone less knowledgeable about the topic-at-hand than either he or Protagoras would be ill-equipped to serve in the role of supervisor, that anyone equally knowledgeable as they would be no better at supervising the dialogue than they would be themselves, and anyone more knowledgeable could only demonstrate that knowledge by entering into the dialogue with them in the first place. Therefore, there can be no outside supervisor to genuine dialogue – for genuine dialogue to occur, everyone must be willing to participate in the dialogue and to supervisor it together (Gonzalez, 54–55). Socrates concludes:
“And for this plan there is no need to have one man as supervisor; you will all supervise it together.” (Plato, Protagoras 338d–e)
Here Socrates and Buber are coming at the issue of participation in dialogue from different perspectives or, rather, they are trying to solve different problems, yet both arrive at the same position: genuine dialogue belongs to everyone. Put their views together and we arrive at the following: if anyone is excluded from a dialogue, whether placed above as a supervisor, cast below as unqualified to speak, or brushed aside as unnecessary, and whether this limitation is self or other-imposed, genuine dialogue will be difficult to achieve as a result.
Cooperation, not competition
Buber and Socrates both view genuine dialogue as a cooperative and not a competitive engagement. Attempting to win an argument –in other words, treating dialogue as a competition – will destroy its genuineness.
This point is intimately tied to those of free expression and of participation reviewed above. When anyone present for the dialogue does not participate in it (for one reason or another), that person’s presence then takes on a corrosive property as that person becomes a spectator to be won over.
Buber describes one such incident:
“I had a friend whom I account one of the most considerable men of our age. He was a master of conversation, and he loved it: his genuineness as a speaker was evident. But once it happened that he was sitting with two friends and with the three wives, and a conversation arose in which by its nature the women were clearly not joining, although their presence in fact had a great influence. The conversation among the men soon developed into a duel between two of them (I was the third). The other ‘duelist,’ also a friend of mine, was of a noble nature; he too was a man of true conversation, but given more to objective fairness than to the play of the intellect, and a stranger to any controversy. The friend whom I have called a master of conversation did not speak with his usual composure or strength, but he scintillated, he fought, he triumphed. The dialogue was destroyed.” (Buber 2, 88)
This anecdote again has a close parallel in Plato’s Protagoras. There, Socrates has been attempting to engage Protagoras in dialogue, though Protagoras has instead for his part opted to deliver prepared speeches that have been met with applause from passive spectators in the room. When Socrates asks Protagoras to forgo his long speeches and instead engage in genuine dialogical exchange, Protagoras responds:
“Socrates […], I have undertaken in my time many contests of speech, and if I were to do what you demand, and argue just in the way that my opponent demanded, I should not be held superior to anyone nor would Protagoras have made a name among the Greeks.” (Plato, Protagoras 335a).
Here, Protagoras reveals that to him dialogue is not a cooperative search for truth or understanding but a “contest,” something to be won or lost. The important thing for Protagoras is to triumph, to “be held superior.” The presence of bystanders (as those to be ‘won over’) only engenders this corrosive desire.
Socrates responds by likening Protagoras to a competitive sprinter and implores Protagoras to slow down to match his pace:
“I wish that […], I could keep pace with such runners, but of course I cannot. If you want to have the spectacle of Criso [a famous Olympic runner] and me running together, you must ask him to adapt his pace; for whereas I cannot run fast, he can run slowly. So if you desire to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method of answering which he used at first—in short sentences and keeping to the point raised.” (Plato, Protagoras, 336a)
As Gonzalez notes, if Protagoras is to ‘adapt his pace’ to Socrates’ this would mean seeking to cooperate with Socrates rather than to best him in the “race” (Gonzalez, 53).
Thinking is dialogical
Both Buber and Socrates recognize the dialogical nature of thought – that thought is ‘speaking with oneself’ – while nevertheless recognizing that dialogue is most at home when taking place between individuals.
Buber says:
“Against the insight into the dialogical character of speech, it will probably be pointed out that thinking is essentially a man’s speaking to himself. A reality is doubtless touched on here, but it is only touched on, not grasped. The so-called dialogue with oneself is possible only because of the basic fact of men’s speaking with each other.” (Buber 2, 150)
Socrates, in Plato’s Theaetetus, says:
“But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion.” (Plato, Theaetetus, 189e–190a)
This can be supplemented by the following statement in the Protagoras:
“[I]f one observes something alone, forthwith one has to go about searching until one discovers somebody to whom one can show it off and who can corroborate it.” (Plato, Protagoras, 348d)
Put together, Socrates’ position is very close to Buber’s: thinking, which has a dialogical structure, is ‘conversing with oneself’ that nevertheless is no substitute for dialogue with others, which remains the true standard.
Dialogue and the ‘between’
Buber and Socrates both envision the best human life as a life ‘in between’ that is actualized in genuine dialogue.
Maurice Friedman describes Buber’s ‘sphere of between’ as follows:
“[W]hen two individuals ‘happen’ to each other, then there is an essential remainder which is common to them, but which reaches out beyond the special sphere of each. That remainder is the basic reality, the ‘sphere of between. […] The unfolding of this sphere Buber calls ‘the dialogical.’ The psychological, that which happens within the souls of each, is only the secret accompaniment to the dialogue. The meaning of this dialogue is found in neither one nor the other of the partners, nor in both taken together, but in their interchange.” (Friedman, 85)
For Buber, ‘the dialogical’ is the true essence of reality. When we engage in genuine dialogue, we are most truly alive to this reality.
Socrates’ conception of the ‘in between’ is very different from Buber’s, also comes to fruition in genuine dialogue. As Gonzalez explains:
“Socrates’ own conception of human goodness […] [is] that being good is impossible for human beings and is a prerogative of the gods only. All that we can aspire to is becoming good […] The only possible human good, understood as a continual process of becoming, is to be found in dialogue.” (Gonzalez, 51–2)
In other words, Socrates believes that humans are inherently flawed beings and as such, we can never be perfectly good. Therefore, the best human life will necessarily exist between the extremes of absolute good and bad. The best we can do is to work toward becoming better through dialogue.
Hans-George Gadamer, speaking of Plato’s philosophy as a whole, explains this in language even more similar to Buber’s:
“[Plato’s philosophy] knows man as a creature that is thus ‘on the way’ and ‘in between’.” (Gadamer 3–4)
While Buber and Plato’s Socrates conceive of this ‘in between’ in very different ways, each nevertheless views genuine dialogue is the vehicle for arriving at this state in which the human being reaches its fullest potential.
Turning, not teaching
Finally, I’d like to review one final similarity between Buber and Socrates: neither claims to be a teacher with doctrines or dogmas to impart. Rather, instead of teaching, each claims that he can only ‘turn’ or ‘point’ someone to an existing truth.
As Buber says:
“I have no teaching. I only point to something. I point to reality. I point to something in reality that has not or had too little been seen. I take him who listens to me by the hand and lead him to the window. I open the window and point to what is outside.” (Katz, 418)
This is reminiscent of Socrates’ assertion that he is not a teacher, but akin to a gadfly who rouses a horse by stinging it (Plato, Apology, 19d–e, 30e). Socrates accomplishes this rousing with his distinct method of questioning, often referred to as either the Socratic method or the Socratic elenchus. In similar language to that of Buber, Konrad Gaiser describes the aim of the Socratic elenchus as follows:
“The elenchus produces a turning around, a pointing to and moving toward the truth.” (Gaiser, 185–186, my trans.)
The truths that Buber and Socrates see are different from one another. For Buber it is the truth of dialogical reality or the ‘sphere of between’ as reviewed above. For Socrates, it is the truth of our ignorance about ethical matters, the recognition of which is necessary for insight into true ethical knowledge (Gaiser, 18). Nevertheless, each has a similar understanding of his role as one who turns others towards the truth by way of dialogue.
In conclusion
Martin Buber’s and Socrates’ conceptions of genuine dialogue differ significantly in some ways while nevertheless sharing considerable common ground. These similarities include unconditional acceptance of one’s dialogical partner; the willingness to express oneself in dialogue without regard to personal reputation; the willingness to respond to one’s dialogical partner in an authentic, unscripted way; and the willingness to cooperate in the search for truth rather than to compete. Additionally, each believes thinking itself to have a dialogical structure, and that dialogue is the means by which humans reach their potential. Finally, neither man saw himself as a teacher, but rather one who merely points toward or helps others to turn toward the truth.
References
Abramovitch, H. (2015). The Influence of Martin Buber’s Philosophy of Dialogue on Psychotherapy: His Lasting Contribution. In P. Mendes-Flohr (Ed.), Dialogue as a Trans-disciplinary Concept: Martin Buber’s Philosophy of Dialogue and its Contemporary Reception (1st ed., pp. 169–182). De Gruyter. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvbj7kb3.13
Buber, M. (2013). I and Thou (Ronald Gregor Smith, Trans). London, Bloomsbury. (Original work published 1923)
Buber, M. (1999). Martin Buber on psychology and psychotherapy: Essays, letters, and dialogue. (J. B. Agassi, Ed.). Syracuse University Press.
Calogero, G. (1955). Socrate, Nuova Antologia, 465(11), 291–308.
Friedman, M. S. (1956). Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Gadamer, H. G. (1991) Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus. Yale University Press. (Original work published 1931)
Gaiser, K (1959). Protreptik und Paränese. Tübingen: Kohlhammer Verlag.
Gonzalez, F. (2014). The Virtue of Dialogue, Dialogue as Virtue in Plato’s Protagoras. (2014). Philosophical Papers, 43(1), 33–66.
Katz, R. L. (1975). Martin Buber and Psychotherapy Hebrew Union College Annual, 46, 413–431. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23506881
Plato (1967). Plato in Twelve Volumes, W.R.M. Lamb, Trans). Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License
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